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Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Subpoena Must 
Be Initiated hy Service of Process-
Hemphill v. Lenz* 
Over a four-year period the city of Philadelphia had entered 
into contracts with Marbelite Company, a New York corporation, 
for traffic signal equipment. Acting pursuant to section 8-409 of 
the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter,1 the city controller served 
the treasurer of Marbelite, in Philadelphia,2 with a subpoena re-
quiring him to produce certain corporate records and to testify con-
cerning requisitions for payments on the contracts. Refusing to com-
ply with the subpoena, the treasurer returned to New York.8 The 
• 413 Pa. 9, 195 A.2d 780 (1963). 
I. PHILADELPHIA HO!\[E RULE CHARTER § 8-409 (1951) provides: 
"Power to Obtain Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Documents. Every 
officer, department, board or commission authorized to hold hearings or conduct 
investigations shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of documents and other evidence and for that purpose it may issue 
subpoenas requiring the attendance of persons and the production of documents 
and cause them to be served in any part of the City. If any witness shall refuse 
to testify as to any fact within his knowledge or to produce any documents 
within his possession or under his control, the facts relating to such refusal 
shall forthwith be reported to any one of the Courts of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County and all questions arising upon such refusal • . . shall as 
promptly as possible be heard by such court. If the court shall determine that 
the testimony or document required of such witness is legally competent and ought 
to be given or produced by him, the court may make an order commanding 
such witness to testify or to produce documents or do both and if the witness 
shall thereafter refuse so to testify or so to produce documents in disobedience of 
such order of the court, the court may deal with the witness as in other cases." 
Section 6-402 specifically authorizes the controller to subpoena any person to obtain 
evidence in connection with payments demanded from the city, but provides no 
enforcement procedure. 
2. Since the powers conferred by the Charter do not ex.tend beyond Philadelphia's 
geographical limits, the subpoena is invalid unless served within the city limits. 
PHILADELPHIA CHARTER COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE VOTERS BY THE PHILADELPHIA 
CHARTER COMMISSION 260 (1952). 
3. Counsel for the treasurer of Marbelite appeared before the controller to deny 
the validity of the subpoena, arguing that service on a foreign corporation ex.tended 
the controller's jurisdiction beyond the city limits. Brief for Appellant, p. 16a, 
Hemphill v. Lenz, 413 Pa. 9, 195 A.2d 780 (1963) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
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controller then filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County and obtained an order to show cause why the 
treasurer should not be compelled to obey the subpoena. The treas-
urer appeared specially to contest the court's jurisdiction on the 
ground that he had not been served with the court's process. The 
common pleas court overruled this objection, apparently reasoning 
that, because of the treasurer's evasive tactics to avoid process, regis-
tered letters mailed to the company's New York office supplied 
notice of the impending proceeding and sufficed to give the court 
jurisdiction.4 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
held) reversed, one judge dissenting. A judicial proceeding for en-
forcement of an administrative subpoena under section 8-409 must 
be commenced by service of process from the enforcing court. 
While the power to issue subpoenas5 is inherent in courts of 
record, 6 administrative agencies require statutory authorization to 
issue subpoenas.7 Most federal and state agencies, including munici-
palities, are given broad authority to issue subpoenas.8 While the 
United States Supreme Court at one time limited the use of ad-
ministrative subpoenas to inquiries involving a specific breach of 
the law, 9 the Court has since repudiated this restrictive view, 10 thus 
This objection probably was not well taken because the treasurer was served within 
the city and Marbelite had contracted to observe the provisions of the Philadelphia 
Home Rule Charter. Brief for Appellee, p. 5. The point was not raised on appeal. 
4. Principal case at 12, 195 A.2d at 782. PA. R. CIV. P. § 2079(a)(2), requires that 
out-of-state service on nonresident defendants be made either personally or by 
registered letter -mailed by the sheriff to the defendant. Although the controller 
mailed at least two registered letters to the treasurer, he failed to send them through 
the sheriff's office. Hence, the controller failed to follow either method prescribed 
by § 2079. The trial judge ruled that this failure was inconsequential. Brief for 
Appellant, p. 20a, principal case. Cf. PA. R. CIV. P. § 126, which directs a trial judge 
to disregard errors or defects in procedure which do not affect the substantive rights 
of the parties. It seems evident that the continuing business relationship between 
Marbelite and the city would bring the company within the reach of Pennsylvania's 
long-arm statute. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3142 (1958). A provision in the contract 
with Marbelite, appointing a city officer as agent for the company to receive service 
of process might have enabled the city to avoid altogether the need for out-of-state 
service. See National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); Comment, 
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 733 (1964). 
5. The term subpoena, as used hereafter, includes a subpoena duces tecum. 
6. Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 
65-66 (1924) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Willard, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 476-77 (1839). 
7. In re Application of Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 31, 31 Atl. 522, 524 (1894); Common-
wealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Orsini, 368 Pa. 259, 263, 81 A.2d 891, 893 (1951). 
8. For a comprehensive review of subpoena powers under all -major federal statutes, 
see Rogge, Inquisitions by Officials-A Study of Due Process Requirements in 
Administrative Investigations, 47 MINN. L. REv. 939 (1963). An illustrative state statute 
is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 200 (1962), set forth in note 23 infra. See also Ebel, In-
vestigatory Powers of City Councils, 38 l\fARQ. L. REv. 223 (1955). 
9. Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908). Although the decision rested on statutory 
construction, the Court's language suggested that the prohibition against subpoenas 
in solely investigatory proceedings was constitutionally required. Id. at 419-20. 
10. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950); Oklahoma Press 
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946) (dictum). 
1300 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63 
permitting issuance by agencies in purely investigatory proceedings. 
Where issuance is authorized by statute, state court decisions gen-
erally uphold the validity of an administrative subpoena unless "the 
futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable 
or obvious .... "11 
The effectiveness of a subpoena lies in the power of the issuing 
tribunal to compel compliance. Unlike courts of record, however, 
administrative agencies generally have not been empowered to pun-
ish noncompliance by fine or imprisonment.12 For example, federal 
agencies must invoke the aid of federal district courts to enforce 
subpoenas.13 In 1894 the Supreme Court endorsed this indirect en-
forcement procedure in ICC v. Brimson,14 and in dictum proscribed 
direct agency enforcement of subpoenas.15 The Court concluded 
that administrative tribunals could not be granted authority to com-
pel obedience because subpoena enforcement requires a final de-
termination, essentially judicial rather than administrative, that the 
subpoenaed party is under a legal duty to comply.16 Congressional 
adherence to the indirect enforcement procedure has forestalled a 
test of the Brimson dictum, itself now questionable.17 However, 
some states have provided for direct agency enforcement,18 and some 
have even delegated this power to municipalities.19 In these states 
the courts generally require explicit statutory authority,20 although 
one court has held that direct enforcement power is inherent in 
11. Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 381, 176 N.E. 537, 539 
(1931). See I DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 3.04 (1958), for a discussion of recent 
trends in federal and state decisions. The validity of the subpoena was not questioned 
in the principal case. 
12. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2195(4) (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
13. E.g., 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958) (FTC); 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1958) (SEC); 26 Stat. 743 (1891), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 12(3) (1958) (ICC); 72 Stat. 792 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1484(c) (1958) (CAB); 49 Stat. 
455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1958) (NLRB). 
14. 154 U.S. 447 (1894). 
15. "Such [an administrative] body could not, under our system of government, 
and consistently with due process of law, be invested with authority to compel 
obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or imprisonment." Id. at 485. 
16. Ibid. 
17. The contempt power is not exclusively judicial; Congress can punish for 
contempt of its committees. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935). Many com-
mentators argue that the enforcement power can be delegated to federal administrative 
agencies. E.g., Benton, Administrative Subpoena Enforcement, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 874, 
883 (1963); Note, 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 1541, 1552 (1958). 
18. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 257.322 (1960) (automobile license appeal board 
granted power to punish for contempt); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-124 (1955) (state board 
of optometry granted power to punish for contempt); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 
5190 (1962) (industrial commission granted power to punish for contempt). Apparently 
no due process objection to contempt citations imposed by state agencies has reached 
the Supreme Court. However, some state courts have invalidated statutes investing 
boards with the power to punish for disobedience. E.g., People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 
337, 296 Pac. 271 (1931); Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N.E. 190 (1892). 
19. See generally Ebel, supra note 8, at 235 &: nn. 104-13. 
20. See, e.g., In the Matter of Blue, 46 Mich. 268, 9 N.W. 441 (1881). 
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agencies authorized to issue subpoenas.21 Nevertheless, most states 
permit only indirect enforcement, perhaps reflecting a general at-
titude that the power to punish for contempt should be limited to 
an independent judiciary and not entrusted to an indefinite number 
of loosely supervised, semi-political public officials.22 However, the 
subpoena enforcement procedures in both the Pennsylvania Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act23 and section 8-409 of the Philadelphia 
Home Rule Charter24 requiring indirect enforcement are similar 
to those followed by federal agencies and most states. 
Utilization of the indirect enforcement procedure raises the 
question of whether the jurisdiction of the enforcing court is de-
pendent upon additional service of process on the subpoenaed party 
when an agency, rather than the court, initially issues the subpoena. 
Had the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter directed the controller to 
secure subpoenas from the court of common pleas, no question re-
garding that court's jurisdiction would have arisen in the principal 
case, since the treasurer was served with the subpoena within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Some jurisdictions have re-
stricted authority to issue subpoenas to the courts,25 but judicial con-
trol over issuance has proved an ineffective check against potential 
abuse of the subpoena power.26 Unless the subpoenaed party objects, 
a court usually cannot test a subpoena's validity and, thus, is not 
in a position to govern its issuance. Indeed, judges seldom issue 
subpoenas; almost uniformly the clerk of the court issues a blank 
subpoena to a party upon request.27 In New York, for example, an 
21. In the Matter of Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156 S.E. 791 (1931) (Industrial Com-
mission administering the Workmen's Compensation Act). 
22. "The subpoena power 'is a power capable of oppressive use, especially when 
it may be indiscriminately delegated and the subpoena is not returnable before a 
judicial officer .•• .' " United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187 (1956). Perhaps the 
dictum in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), has persuaded state legislatures 
to enact the indirect enforcement procedure. See note 15 supra and accompanying 
text. See also 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 12, for a collection of cases and statutes. 
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 200 (1962), provides: 
"Every administrative department, every independent administrative board and 
commission, every departmental and administrative board and commission, and 
the several workmen's referees, shall have the power to issue subpoenas, re-
quiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers 
pertinent to any hearing before such department, board, commission, or officer, 
and to examine such witnesses, books, and papers. Any witness, who refuses to 
obey a subpoena issued hereunder, or who refuses to be sworn or affirmed, or 
to testify, or who is guilty of any contempt after summons to appear, may be 
punished for contempt of court, and, for this purpose, an application may be 
made to any court of common pleas within whose territoriaf jurisdiction the 
offense was committed, for which purpose, such court is hereby given jurisdic-
tion." (Emphasis added.) 
24. Note 1 supra. 
25. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1886, Ch. 543 (now N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 7). 
26. Traditionally, potential abuse of the subpoena power ·has been a judicial 
concern. See note 22 supra. This theme is also present in the principal case. See 
notes 30 &: 31 infra and accompanying text. 
27. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a); 12 PA. R. CIV. P. 4018; MICH. RULES 506.2. 
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attorney to a court proceeding is empowered by statute to issue 
subpoenas.28 
Under the New York statute and similar provmons in other 
states,29 a lawyer seeking judicial aid to enforce a validly served sub-
poena need not serve the subpoenaed party with additional process 
or a complaint. Admittedly, issuance by an attorney occurs only after 
the proceeding is before the court. Nevertheless, the la'wyer's relation 
to the court resembles closely that of the administrator under the 
indirect enforcement procedure: both complete and serve subpoenas 
without the court's knowledge, but both must apply to the court for 
enforcement. Although the administrator, unlike the lawyer, is not 
an officer of the court, this distinction seemingly does not demand an 
additional procedural requirement for judicial enforcement of the 
administrative subpoena. Furthermore, a requirement that additional 
process be served upon a subpoenaed person before enforcement 
proceedings may be instituted provides no safeguards that are not al-
ready present in the indirect enforcement procedure. Judicial con-
trol over the subpoena is necessarily maintained at the enforcement 
stage, when the subpoenaed party is before the court. Upon proper 
objection the judge can modify or quash an oppressive or unwar-
ranted subpoena. Therefore, the Pennsylvania court was unneces-
sarily restrictive in its attitude of "utmost caution"30 toward the use 
and enforcement of an administrative subpoena simply because, in 
the abstract, "the subpoena power is fraught with the possibilities 
of abuse."31 Actions to enforce judicial or administrative subpoenas 
are only ancillary to a main proceeding. Accordingly, once a sub-
poena itself is validly served, it seems anomalous to impose a require-
ment of acquisition of jurisdiction by another service of process in 
a subsequent subpoena enforcement proceeding. The anomaly is 
even greater when this requirement is imposed only in proceedings 
to enforce administrative subpoenas.32 
28. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 2302. 
29. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 45(£); PA. R. Crv. P. 4019; MICH. RULES 506.6. 
30. Principal case at 12, 195 A.2d at 782. Seemingly, the court reasoned that the 
possibilities of abuse raised a presumption against jurisdiction which the Home 
Rule Charter failed to rebut specifically. 
31. Ibid. "Possibilities of abuse" exist at every level of government; however, 
there is no reason to suppose that the potentiality for abuse is greater at the municipal 
level. See Ebel, supra note 8, to the effect that city councils have, on the whole, 
wisely used the subpoena power. Historically, local officers have been invested with 
the power to subpoena. See In re Application of Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 31 Atl. 522 
(1894). Moreover, the presence of the subpoena power in the Philadelphia Home 
Rule Charter represents a policy assessment that the need for the power outweighs 
any attendant risk of abuse. The Home Rule Charter enjoys the stature accorded 
a state legislative enactment. In re Addison, 385 Pa. 48, 57, 122 A.2d 272, 276 (1956). 
32. Compare the principal case with United States v. Vivian, 224 F.2d 53, 57 
(7th Cir. 1955): 
"It would frustrate the theory and purpose of § 235(a) [of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952] if every rejected subpoena would have to be subjected 
to a separate civil proceeding accompanied by issuance of process bottomed on 
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In the principal case, the court might have construed section 
8-409 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter33 so as to reach a 
different conclusion. The statute stresses a speedy determination and 
outlines few procedural steps, thus suggesting that a complete civil 
action is not contemplated. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Administra-
tive Procedure Act,34 which the court seemingly rejected as an aid 
in interpreting the Home Rule Charter,85 expressly provides that 
initial issuance of the subpoena by an agency confers jurisdiction 
on the referrant court to enforce compliance. Despite apparent am-
biguity in many federal statutes,86 this more liberal view also prevails 
in the federal courts because, as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has stated, "pyramiding summonses on subpoenas serves no 
useful purpose."87 It may be that the Pennsylvania court was con-
cerned that, without an additional service of process, a subpoenaed 
party might not receive fair notice that an enforcement proceeding 
had been commenced against him. However, a registered letter in-
forming the subpoenaed party of the enforcement action constitutes 
reasonable notice,88 and this procedure had been employed by the 
city controller.so 
a complaint •.•• Application to the district court was the statutory § 235 method 
of enforcing a subpoena by an order of court decreeing compliance. Clearly, 
enforcement by such an order ought to be a sure expeditious way of gaining 
obedience because disregard of the district court's order constitutes contempL To 
construe the judicial aid mentioned in § 235 as requiring resort to instituting 
a new law suit requiring service of process, at its threshhold, would frustrate 
the clear purpose of § 235. Again we point out [the subpoenaed witness] is only 
sought as a witness and in an entirely different proceeding against other persons 
now awaiting her attendance to give testimony. On her theory every witness 
could forestall the government and force it to institute as many law suits as 
there are witnesses in any given case." 
33. Note 1 supra. 
34. Note 23 supra. 
35. Principal case at 13 n.5, 195 A.2d at 782 n.5. 
36. United States v. Vivian, 224 F.2d 53, 57 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
953 (1956); Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1941); 
Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1941); United States v. Tyson's 
Poultry, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Ark. 1963). 
37. United States v. Vivian, supra note 36, at 57. Similar federal holdings include 
the cases cited in note 36 supra. A state case taking the opposite view is BroveIIi 
v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 524, 364 P.2d 462 (1961) (suggestion that valid service 
of both subpoena and order to show cause are prerequisites to judicial enforcement 
of administrative subpoena). 
38. "Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by 
registered mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant 
of the suit." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). 
39. Note 4 supra. The method of subpoena enforcement under the Philadelphia 
Home Rule Charter actually gives the subpoenaed party a second opportunity 
to comply because he will not be held in contempt of court unless he disregards 
a court order compelling him to appear before the administrative agency. This 
procedure affords the subpoenaed party protection against inadvertent failure to 
respond initially to the subpoena. Compare N.Y. CIV. PRAc. I.Aw § 2808(b), under 
which failure to comply initially with an authorized, nonjudicial subpoena may 
have immediate consequences: the court can order the subpoenaed party to pay 
the issuer of the subpoena fifty dollars as well as impose costs not exceeding fifty 
dollars. 
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Although under the Pennsylvania long-arm statute40 the non-
resident subpoenaed party in the principal case may now be served
with process conferring jurisdiction on the court, the holding not
only discourages respect for the administrative subpoena 4' but also
impairs efficient disposition of administrative affairs.4 In the inter-
est both of effectuating the subpoena power and of promoting only
meaningful procedure, courts should rule that valid service of the
subpoena is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court in an en-
forcement proceeding.
40. Note 4 supra.
41. "A subpoena has never been treated as an invitation to a game of hare and
hounds, in which the witness must testify only if cornered at the end of the chase.
If that were the case, then, indeed, the great power of testimonial compulsion, so
necessary to the effective functioning of courts and legislatures, would be a nullity.
We have often iterated the importance of this public duty. United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
42. A strong argument in favor of direct subpoena enforcement by an admin-
istrative agency is the potentially long delay in obtaining a final judicial order.
See Benton, supra note 17, at 886-87.
